The increasing focus on quantum security is prompting security leaders to take stock of their organization’s readiness. However, many might be misreading the situation, mistaking external protections for comprehensive internal safeguards against quantum threats.
Recent research from F5 Labs reveals that over half of the world’s top million websites support post-quantum key exchange. This statistic is somewhat misleading; only 27% of Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) indicated that they are actively implementing post-quantum cryptography (PQC), according to a KPMG survey.
Much of the reported progress can be attributed to content delivery network (CDN) providers enabling PQC by default, not businesses upgrading their own infrastructure, indicating a gap in true readiness against quantum threats. David Warburton, director of F5 Labs, highlights this issue: “The 54% figure may seem promising, but it’s primarily driven by CDN settings. If you exclude Cloudflare-hosted sites, that number drops significantly to just 22%.”
F5 Labs’ analysis only covers the website front end, ignoring the crucial application servers that reside behind CDNs. Warburton notes that these internal connections are increasingly at risk of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, a serious concern that organizations must prioritize.
Serhii Nikolaichuk, founder of The Capital Index, reinforces this perspective, stating that the systems operating behind CDNs—such as private traffic traversing through service meshes, VPNs, and SSH—remain largely unprotected and invisible from the outside, making true enterprise readiness a largely internal focus.
Beyond the Edge
Industry experts echo the findings from F5 Labs, emphasizing that genuine post-quantum readiness is about upgrading every layer of the technology stack. While edge adoption is a step forward, it does not equate to readiness, according to Anastazija Pažin of Deloitte. "CDN-enabled PQC secures client-to-edge connections, but this protection doesn’t extend to the origin server, internal APIs, or service-to-service communications," she points out.
The momentum for post-quantum adoption is strongest in scenarios where centralized enabling is possible. However, as Ben Packman from PQShield notes, this disparity exists partly due to guidance on implementation lagging behind core standards. For instance, the finalization of PQC standards by the NIST in 2024 and a recent IETF standard on hybrid key exchange mechanisms for TLS 1.3 illustrate the timing issues in industry readiness.
Technical Debt
Companies face considerable challenges in upgrading to quantum-resistant technologies, largely due to reliance on outdated systems and other dependencies. Legacy clients, partner integrations, and sluggish change-control processes hinder swift transitions to PQC.
The 54% statistic refers only to PQC key exchange support, and currently, PQC certificates are not publicly available. Warburton explains, “Merkle Tree Certificates could assist browsers, but many platforms still require PQC certificates, which pose their own challenges due to size.”
Certificate management becomes a significant hurdle, especially as shorter certificate lifetimes come into effect. “Organizations still handling certificate provisioning manually will struggle greatly with impending 47-day lifetimes,” Warburton adds.
This PQC-readiness gap is particularly alarming in sensitive sectors; only 35% of government and telecommunications websites supported post-quantum key exchange in the F5 Labs study.
Industry Differences
Organizations in government and critical infrastructure sectors often grapple with more complex, long-standing technology frameworks, leading to unique challenges in achieving quantum readiness. The F5 Labs study indicates that over 10% of sampled websites don’t yet support TLS 1.3, a necessary prerequisite for implementing the tested post-quantum key exchanges.
F5 argues that while active measures at a public website's edge are commendable, they do not ascertain the readiness of internal servers and applications against quantum threats. Chris Hickman, CSO at Keyfactor, notes the importance of recognizing the nuanced scope of PQC preparedness. “Sectors such as finance, telecommunications, and government exhibit strong PQC readiness, while healthcare is ramping up its initiatives. This discrepancy reflects the nature of web-focused analysis versus more comprehensive organizational efforts,” he explains.
Financial institutions and operators within critical infrastructure are increasingly employing strategies such as cryptographic inventories and risk assessments to tackle PQC, but Deloitte's Pažin cautions that maturity in planning does not equate to deployment maturity. The complex interplay of hardware security modules and interoperability requirements must not be overlooked.
Preparing for PQC
Organizations are encouraged to undertake a thorough inventory of their cryptographic practices, prioritizing sensitive data types that necessitate long-term confidentiality. This should involve assessing internal applications, APIs, and legacy systems in addition to public-facing websites.
Warburton further advises, “Create a comprehensive cryptographic bill of materials, ensuring someone is accountable for its upkeep.” Gradual removal of legacy dependencies, along with enabling hybrid PQC when feasible, is recommended alongside automating certificate management processes to minimize the friction of updates.
Pažin asserts that a serious enterprise readiness evaluation should explore how well organizations grasp their cryptographic dependencies and their ability to transition away from vulnerable algorithms without extensive infrastructure disruption.
